The December 1999 major terrorist attack known as the Kandahar hijacking, or IC-814 hijacking, took place. The December 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814, sometimes referred to as the Kandahar hijacking, happened when the plane was traveling from Kathmandu, Nepal. It was a significant act of terrorism. Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 was taken over by five armed terrorists from the militant organization Harkat-ul-Mujahideen when it was traveling from Kathmandu, Nepal, to Delhi, India. The kidnapping took place over a few days and resulted in a heated standoff that was resolved in the Taliban-controlled city of Kandahar, Afghanistan.
75.1) Hijack Timeline
Indian Airlines flight IC 814 was scheduled to depart from Kathmandu, Nepal, on December 24, 1999, and arrive in Delhi, India. There were 180 people on board the aircraft when it took off, including the crew and the passengers. Roberto Giori, the proprietor of De La Rue Giori at the time, which dominated the majority of the global money printing market at the time, was one of the passengers.
Senior steward Anil Sharma was approached shortly after the flight departed from Kathmandu by a man donning a ski mask, who informed him that he was carrying a bomb and that the plane was being hijacked. The hijackers gave Captain Devi Sharan the order to "fly west," and as a result, the aircraft entered Pakistani airspace. However, Pakistani Air Traffic Control denied the pilot's request to land in Lahore, Pakistan. Captain Sharan was given permission by the hijackers to land the aircraft at Amritsar, Punjab, in order to refuel when they informed him that there was not enough fuel to continue.
According to later passenger testimonies, the hijackers divided the males from the ladies and children, blindfolded them, threatened them with explosives if they did not comply, and ordered the crew to remove the lunch that had been served.
(1) Arriving in Amritsar, India, at 4:40 p.m., Indian Air Traffic Control (ATC) was notified of the hijacking. When word broke that the plane had been hijacked, the Indian government's Crisis Management Group, headed by Union Secretary Prabhat Kumar, did not meet, and neither the Research and Analysis Wing nor the Intelligence Bureau were informed of the hijacking at that time. At 7:00 p.m., Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian prime minister, received a briefing about the incident.
(2) The Indian ATC contacted flight IC 814 at 6:04 PM but had not received instructions on what to do next. Captain Devi Sharan informed Pakistani ATC that they were almost out of fuel and that they were not permitted to land in Lahore. Sharan kept in touch with ATC, asking them to get in touch with Pakistan and ask for permission to land since the hijackers had already threatened to execute ten hostages if their demands were not satisfied and they did not want to land in India. The Indian High Commission in Pakistan asked for permission for the jet to land there at 6:30 p.m., but they were turned down.
(3) After receiving a communication from Captain Sharan, flight IC 814 started to descend over the closest airport in Amritsar at 6:44 p.m., when local officials approached it. Later, Sarabjeet Singh, the state's director general of police for Punjab, said that he learned about the hijacking only after seeing it on television that evening at six o'clock. L.K. Advani, the Home Minister of the Union Government, later said that he learned about the incident via the press rather than from the Crisis Management Group, which has been constituted since then. Since Bakshi Ram, his replacement, was on leave at the time of the incident, J.P. Birdi, despite having recently resigned as the area's Inspector-General of Police, came into contact with the jet.
(4) IC 814 requested that the aircraft be refueled immediately upon landing. Later, Captain Sharan said that he had hoped that the Indian government would help prevent the hijacking and save the jet from having to take off from Amritsar once more. A local committee comprising the District Collector, the highest-ranking police and intelligence officials, and the airport manager was established in compliance with the Crisis Management Group's hijacking contingency plans. They were directed to postpone the plane's refueling as long as feasible. The committee had received these directives from the Central Government at 6:40 p.m., but their initial response was delayed due to a phone call that contained conflicting directions.
(5) Captain Sharan communicated with ATC four times throughout the takeoff and landing at 7:50 p.m., telling them that the hijackers had started killing hostages with Kalashnikov rifles and asking them to refuel the aircraft as soon as possible to avoid any more casualties. During the plane's stay in Amritsar, the hijackers had declined to speak with local law enforcement authorities. Subsequent reports claimed that the hijackers enraged about the refueling delay, had used a knife to attack Satnam Singh, a German national inside the aircraft, inflicting multiple neck wounds.
(6) The Crisis Management Group ordered the local Punjab Police Commandos to be on standby at 7:45 p.m. and to accompany the fuel-reloading vehicles to the aircraft in order to deflate the tires and immobilize the aircraft. The ATC instructed the driver of the fuel tanker, which was assigned to obstruct the aircraft's path, to slow down because the plane was approaching at a high speed. Upon getting this command, the tanker suddenly stopped. It was later discovered that this tactic led the hijackers to believe that the refueling procedure would hinder their ability to depart, so they gave Captain Sharan the order to take off right away. As a result, the aircraft barely avoided colliding with the fuel tanker on the runway. The hijackers had five people strapped into seats near the front with their hands bound, and they threatened to have them executed if the plane did not take off right away. At 7:49 p.m., the aircraft departed Amritsar, with Captain Sharan informing the ATC that "we are all dying." Just as IC 814 was taking off, commandos from the National Security Guard, an Indian special forces team, arrived at the airport.
(7) Arriving in Pakistan's Lahore: Flight IC 814 asked to land as it approached Lahore, Pakistan, but Pakistani ATC refused, turning down all of the airport's lights and navigational aids to stop a landing. Captain Sharan tried to crash-land the aircraft without using lights or navigational aids since it was running low on fuel and had not been refueled in Amritsar. He almost landed on a roadway. At 8:07 p.m., Pakistani ATC enabled the aircraft to land in Lahore by turning on navigational assistance.
(8) After learning that the aircraft had touched down in Lahore, Pakistan, India requested a helicopter to fly its High Commissioner, G. Parthasarathy, from Islamabad to the airport in Lahore. Additionally, India asked Pakistani officials to make sure the aircraft didn't take off from Lahore. Pakistani forces encircled the jet with commandos from their special forces and shut off the runway lights once more to stop the plane from taking off after it had been refueled. Additionally, they made an unsuccessful attempt to bargain with the hijackers to have the women and children on the plane released. Although a helicopter was sent for the Indian High Commissioner, G. Parthasarthy, he did not arrive in Lahore until Flight IC 814 had been refueled and cleared to depart.
(9) Arriving in Dubai, United Arab Emirates: The crew left Lahore and headed toward Kabul, Afghanistan. The hijackers tried to land in Oman, though, as Kabul Airport did not have night landing capabilities at the time. When the Sultanate's officials turned down their request, the hijackers made their way to nearby Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The aircraft was given permission to land at Al Minhad Air Base after being refused entry at Dubai International Airport. 27 passengers were freed by the hijackers, among them Rupin Katyal, a 25-year-old male captive who was badly injured after being repeatedly stabbed by the hijackers. Before the plane touched down at Al Minhad Air Base, Rupin had passed away. The UAE government refused to give Indian authorities permission to attack the aircraft with Indian commandos who had received training in hijack rescue.
(10) Arriving in Afghanistan's Kandahar: India first accepted the Taliban authorities' offer to arbitrate between them and the hijackers after the plane had arrived in Kandahar. India sent a representative from its High Commission in Islamabad to Kandahar since it does not recognize the Taliban government. The negotiation procedure was hindered by India's lack of prior interaction with the Taliban regime.
75.2) Demands
While the passengers on board Flight IC 814 awaited a decision, India decided internally on December 25 and 26 how they would approach negotiations. Subsequently, the passengers said that their meals were not consistent, they had restricted access to clean restrooms and drinking water, and the hijackers used the plane's public address system to spread their message to the other passengers.
In addition to the body of Rupin Katyal, who died while the plane was in Dubai, and Satnam Singh, who was attacked by the hijackers in Amritsar and had knife wounds to his neck, Indian Airlines provided a special relief plane on December 25. The plane carried 27 passengers who had been released.
Home Minister L. K. Advani had argued against trading the hostages for the hijackers' freedom because it would damage the government's reputation, but External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh supported talks with the Taliban. Ajit Doval, an official in the Home Ministry, Vivek Katju, a Joint-Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, and C.D. Sahay, a member of the Cabinet Secretariat, led the team of negotiators dispatched by the Indian government on December 27.
The negotiations failed when Taliban representatives first refused to permit Indian special forces to do a clandestine operation and then refused to permit their own secret forces to try one as well. Taliban officials encircled the aircraft with tanks to prevent any military action, and on December 27, one of the leaders told a local newspaper that the hijackers should either down their guns or leave Afghanistan. Negotiations on the demands of the hijackers were initiated by Indian officials, who took this statement as an agreement that the hijackers would be arrested by Taliban officials upon surrender. The demands were eventually whittled down to three inmates during discussions, along with the release of Sajjad Afghani's body, US$200 million, and 36 prisoners:
(1) Maulana Masood Azhar, who established Jaish-e-Muhammed in 2000, rose to prominence due to the group's suspected involvement in the assaults on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and 2008 in Mumbai, which claimed the lives of 44 CRPF officers.
(2) Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh was detained by Pakistani officials in 2002 after Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and killed. After being jailed in relation to the 1994 kidnappings of Western tourists in India, Sheikh went on to kill Daniel Pearl and is said to have had a major involvement in the preparation of the September 11 attacks on the United States.
(3) Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar has been actively involved in the training of Islamic terrorists in Pakistan-administrated Jammu & Kashmir after his release.
A.S. Dulat, the chief of the Research and Analysis Wing, spoke with Farooq Abdullah, the chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, on December 30 in an attempt to persuade him to free two convicts as the hijacker had requested. These detainees were now housed in jails in Kashmir. After cautioning Dulat about the long-term repercussions of his opposition to the detainees' release, Abdullah finally gave in to the Indian government's demands. After being freed from a prison in Srinagar, Mushtaq Ahmad Zargar was taken to Kandahar alongside Sheikh and Azhar.
By now, both the hijackers and the captives had given up their firearms and permitted the hostages to leave the aircraft. According to passenger accounts, the hijackers requested that the passengers express their gratitude to the Afghan government. After that, money was gathered and given to one of the passengers, Anuj Sharma, who was told to use it to commission a souvenir of the hijacking for a Kandahar museum. Nevertheless, Taliban authorities transported the hijackers to Quetta, Pakistan, near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, rather than apprehending them and the three captives who had been turned over to them.
75.3) Conclusion
1. Hijacking: Shortly after it entered Indian airspace on December 24, 1999, an Airbus A300 carrying 176 passengers and crew was taken over. After the hijackers forced the jet to land in Amritsar, India, it took off again without being properly intercepted because of delays and miscommunication.
2. Journey to Kandahar: Before arriving in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the hijacked aircraft stopped in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Lahore, Pakistan. 27 passengers were freed in Dubai; one of them, Rupin Katyal, had been stabbed by the hijackers and was seriously hurt.
3. Demands: Maulana Masood Azhar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, and Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar are three extremists who are detained in India; the hijackers wanted their freedom. They also wanted the body of a militant who was killed returned, along with $200 million in cash.
4. Negotiations: Under the direction of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Indian government held vigorous talks with the hijackers. Although they served as middlemen, the Taliban, who at the time had control of Kandahar, were widely believed to be supporting the hijackers.
5. Resolution: Following seven days of talks, the Indian government consented to the three militants' release in exchange for the passengers' safe return. After the hostages were liberated on December 31, 1999, the insurgents were transported by air to Kandahar.
6. Aftermath: There were major consequences following the attack, and the hijackers were permitted to flee. One of the terrorists who was freed, Maulana Masood Azhar, went on to form the terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed, which carried out several strikes in India, including the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. The IC-814 hijacking altered how such emergencies were handled and revealed weaknesses in Indian security.
The hijacking of IC-814 is still regarded as one of the scariest incidents in Indian aviation and counterterrorism history, emphasizing the difficult tasks involved in responding to terrorist demands.
— Team Yuva Aaveg
(Adarsh Tiwari)
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